BMI secret paper published

A document of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Homeland, which was passed on to us, shows that a paper of the KM4 department of the BMI had been available for days. For your information: The KM4 deals with the protection of critical infrastructures as a special sub-area of civil protection. This involves the protection of organisations and facilities of important importance to the state community, the failure or impairment of which would result in lasting supply bottlenecks, considerable disruption to public safety or other dramatic consequences. The cover letters also show that several ministers were aware of this paper. However, instead of reacting, it appears that the author was “released” yesterday. We have all the original letters WITH names in our possession, but we will not publish them until they do so themselves, in order to protect the people involved. The result of the work will be available shortly: Internal Analysis KM 4 shows:

 serious failures in crisis management
 Deficits in the regulatory framework for pandemics
 Corona crisis is probably a false alarm

Have a look at the complete report here and you too will finally learn what our government has known for days: The shutdown was and is premature, nonsensical and led to more deaths than Covid-19.

Excerpts from the accompanying original report:

According to this, it could be feared that the government measures in the Corona crisis, which have already accumulated to this day, have destroyed potential lifetimes of up to several million life years of the German population… it must be assumed that in the event of a relapse to the level of prosperity of the year 2000 or even 1980, a loss of at least an order of magnitude of several million life years for our society must be assumed.

The evaluation of the above data reveals:

The reporting was partly incomplete.
The report categories changed several times, some of them were taken up again earlier.
The data were partially contradictory (stagnation of developments, decreasing (!) total number of deaths, …).

The data in the situation reports were not suitable for assessing the risk posed by the coronavirus (see the other chapters of this report). The real danger posed by the virus to the population of Germany could not therefore be assessed.
The international figures were also included in the reports without taking the specific national context into account and, by being included in the reporting in the crisis unit, indirectly generated pressure to act. Reports were always made on those countries where spectacular peaks were observed. It was not possible to gain a generalizable insight from this. Exonerating data were not included, although they were also publicly available (e.g.: https://swprs.org/covid-19-hinweis-ii/#latest)
On the contrary: despite excessive data on coronatotes, it became apparent how low the danger was always tending to be compared to everyday health risks (such as an influenza wave) (see the comparative figure in blue in the bottom row of the table.
The addition of any deceased person who was infected to the figures for coronatote led (and continues to lead) to a distortion in the perception of the death event and, among other things, prevents the consequences of collateral damage from being attributed to it. They thus remained statistically invisible. – Example: A person who does not belong to an endangered group, and who did not contract Covid-19 despite infection, dies when his scheduled heart surgery cannot be performed due to heart problems because the clinic canceled; this person would not be counted as a victim of the protective measures, but as a victim of the virus infection. The statements of the statistics turn the true circumstances in this case upside down This highly problematic counting method and counting procedure for the documentation of coronary deaths, which was already conceded by the RKI at the beginning of March 2020, still leads to a falsification and manipulation of the data today, as it masks the effects of the protective measures and is suitable to prevent a comparison of the two central dangers for our society (dangers due to illness, dangers due to protective measures). In this falsification of elementary key data the foundation for wrong decisions at the expense of the population is laid.

Conclusion: The reporting in the situation reports of the Federal Ministry of the Interior was not useful for the assessment of the holistic risk situation confronting our country, because they dealt exclusively with health aspects. There was no monitoring of collateral damage. Even the health data were not suitable for assessing the extent of the risks to our society, they were not differentiated enough, especially not in the context of the overall 200507 evaluation report KM4 a (2).docx Page 43 of 83 of death in our country. However, the data documented in the reports were not only unusable, but also prevented or made more difficult an inventory of further data relevant to decision-making, which moreover are not (yet) the subject of the management reports, by an effect which I have explained by way of example in point 7 (see above). Depending on the extent of the re-labelling, there is reason to suspect that the data of the crisis management decision-making process must be considered manipulated. I myself have repeatedly pointed this out to my superiors in writing and have made concrete proposals as to which meaningful data should be collected or demanded by the departments (Annex 5). The comments also contain comprehensive explanations for understanding the function of the data for risk assessment and in the crisis management mechanism, not only in the health sector. Some of my analyses and suggestions/proposals had been available to the crisis management team since 23 March 2020 (Annex 6), and I presented a “Political Analysis” in its first version on 27 March 2020 (finalised official KM 4 – version of 7 May 2020 in Annex 8). The assessments of the BMI management reports previously examined under 6.1. (conclusion) also apply to the crisis team’s management report to be assessed here. The data provided by the RKI are not to be used as a basis for decision-making. The assessments of the RKI are not covered by the data submitted. The assessments are often speculative, sometimes implausible. Unfortunately, the management report of the crisis unit consists solely of a processing of these data. It is necessary to request specific data from the Federal Ministry of Health or to procure them through the Federal Ministry of the Interior itself in order to finally be able to assess the dangers of the coronavirus to our society with adequate accuracy and to orientate the measures on this assessment. The one-sided use of data and assessments by the RKI for the decision-making process of crisis management is not acceptable in view of the diversity of available institutes, facilities and experts. Due to the far-reaching effects of the protective measures introduced, the future fate of our society will depend on the underlying database and its interpretation. From a civil protection perspective, it is imperative to tap various sources, some of which are in competition with each other. On May 7, 2020, an “Interim Balance Sheet of the Federal Government” was published (https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/gegen-corona-pandemie-1747714) The document has a caption: “Measures taken by the Federal Government to contain the COVID 19 pandemic and to deal with its consequences”. The paper assumes that there is a danger from Covid-19, but does not describe the danger. It is not even mentioned. It is practically there before the paper starts. At no point in the 22-page report is there a description of the dangers and no documentation of a systematic weighing up of measures with their side effects. Connection between risk assessment and decision making Example: In other dangerous situations, such as a firefighting operation at a burning apartment building, the decisions are made by qualified rescue workers, not by the (politically elected) mayor. The fire chief of the fire brigade decides whether the only available ladder is to be used first to rescue a pregnant woman calling for help from a window on one side of the building, or a child waving from the other side of the building, enveloped in thick clouds of smoke. This decision is made by the fire chief (and not the mayor) even if the mayor is standing right next to it, and even if it is the mayor’s house where his wife and child are in distress. .

The question arises as to how effective and practical it can be when, in a pandemic, politics makes decisions and acts in an inflationary manner, when, as in the corona crisis, a few members of the government who have not been trained to deal with such dangerous situations and who usually do not have the necessary expertise to do so are supposed to determine the fate of the country. In the corona pandemic in 2020, it is true that the expertise of experts was called upon from the outset. However, they were very selective. Only selected experts were consulted and only their opinions were taken into account. It is imperative that expertise from specialist virological and immunological disciplines is included in the holistic risk analysis and assessment of a pandemic, but it must be balanced with other factors in this process. In the corona crisis, the professional crisis management team isolated one-sided, filtered specialist information and made it the sole yardstick for every intervention that was carried out. The best specialists are of no use to you. 200507 Evaluation report KM4 a (2).docx Page 63 of 83 Although they are well versed in their very limited field of competence, they do not have the necessary insight into the complex framework conditions that also shape a modern community. Influencing factors from many other special fields are effective in this community. How could the crisis management assume that the medical experts of the RKI have an overview of this? The colleagues at the RKI could only be hopelessly overwhelmed by the demands and expectations that were placed on them during the crisis. A glance at the description of the risk analysis method reveals the uselessness of the risk assessment by RKI: “Risk assessment is a descriptive, qualitative description. For the terms “low”, “moderate”, “high” or “very high” used are not based on quantitative values for the probability of occurrence or extent of damage. However, the three criteria or indicators used for the severity assessment (= extent of damage) (transferability, severity profile and resource burden) are each assessed with quantifiable parameters. (https://www.rki.de/DE/Content/InfAZ/N/Neuartiges_Coronavirus/Risikobewertung_Grundlage.html )

 This means that the Chancellor and the MPs of the countries have taken their far-reaching measures on the basis of a risk assessment which describes risks according to qualitative criteria of low, moderate and high, without any size dimension. The RKI evaluates the danger of the pandemic for our country according to the transmissibility of the pathogen, the number of infections and the severity profile (including the proportion of deaths). Damage to health through collateral damage is not a criterion for the RKI, it is not mentioned, although it has caused greater numbers of deaths than Covid-19 (see Annex to the Summary).

The only justification given by the heads of the federal and state governments for the measures and restrictions on rights they have decreed is that the rapid 200507 Evaluation report KM4 a (2).docx Page 71 of 83 distribution is worrying. It is not explained how the danger is assessed by the Federal Government or the Länder governments or other bodies (e.g. crisis management groups, RKI, …). Nothing at all is said about the danger of the coronavirus. “The Federal Chancellor and the heads of government of the Länder take the following decision: The reduction of contacts is crucial.” Source: Minutes of the Chancellor’s meeting with the heads of government. and heads of government of the Länder on 22 March 2020 https://www.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/975226/1733246/e6d6ae0e89a7ffea1ebf6f32cf472736/2 020-03-22-mpk-data.pdf?download=1 The goal of preventing an uncontrolled increase in the number of cases is a statement that does not reveal what exactly is behind it. All possible questions remain unanswered, e.g. what is meant by case numbers and what the case numbers say about the dangerousness. Also the qualification of the propagation speed as “rapid” is questionable. This can only refer to a micro-view. At the time of the decision, there was no evidence of dangerous propagation – in relation to the entire state for which measures were ordered. The speed of propagation at this level cannot be a substitute or auxiliary criterion for dangerousness. According to the RKI situation report of 22.3.20, there were only 18,610 confirmed “cases” (0.2 per mille of the population), and 55 deceased (0.0006 per mille of the population).